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Much of the safety climate research captures only a transient state in the aviation
environment, by extension limiting organizational responses to transactional
approaches. The limits of the transient annual safety climate audit traps safety
attitudinal/behavioral research in a static or reactive cycle. The present study takes
advantage of a collegiate aviation environment with multiple training locations
(each with its own culture), participating in regular safety climate audits across
flight operations, to develop an enhanced safety culture model. Using longitudinal
climate data collected from the organization, the authors present a mixed-methods
trend analysis of safety climate changes to date, incorporating organizational
structure and resource variables. The longitudinal model creates a more
comprehensive evaluation of the long-term safety culture of the organization at all
training locations and creates a new format for a more enhanced organizational
response. The study utilizes the new longitudinal model as a framework for
developing systems-based responses to climate concerns, and in turn documenting
the impact of the organizational changes made in result. This paper presents initial
findings based on the primary training location; final results are presented at the
ISAP meeting and available after the presentation. Application across multiple
aviation operation settings are discussed, including characteristics and strategies
for improving organizational response to safety climate and culture evaluations.
Safety climate and safety culture have become nearly ubiquituous constructs in current
discussions of both accident prevention and organizational performance (e.g., Block, et al, 2007;
Gibbons et al, 2006; Karanikas, 2016). The ubiquity, rather than being a sign of a topic that has
been over-researched, points to the criticality of these constructs and the acknowledgement that
no research has yet completely tackled or resolved all of the challenges in the organizational
safety climate field. The evolution of research into human error in aviation has continued to
evolve from focus on the individual’s error (e.g., Hunter, 2005) to crew/group level factors (e.g.,
Taylor & Thomas, 2003), and then to larger organizational influences (Mjos, 2004; Block, et al,
2007). This in turn has led to attempts to capture aspects of the the climate and/or culture within
the organization that contribute to or impede ‘safety’ with regard to attitudes, policies, and
behaviors (e.g., Bowen, et al 2011; Bowen, 2013).
Research conducted by Von Thaden, Wiegmann, and Shappell (2006) identified ten categories of
organizational factors that appeared associated with commercial airline accidents investigated by
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). These factors included: training, surveillance,

173

procedures/directives, standards, information, supervision, documentation, pressure,
substantiation, and facilities. Their research indicated that inadequate procedures and directives
were most commonly linked with aviation accidents. Both facets of their investigation provide
strong evidence in favor of a systems theory approach to aviation safety. While the work of von
Thaden, et al. and others (e.g., Soeters & Boer, 2000) in reviewing accident data for safety
culture and organizational systems trends is extremely valuable for the creation of failure models
of safety climate and culture, most aviation practitioners prefer to identify factors that will
support safety in advance of incidents or accidents, rather than being forced to review and
attempt to post facto address these failures.
One strategy to pre-emptively identify weaknesses or risk factors within an aviation organization
is the implementation of an annual or semi-annual “safety climate audit”. Employees at multiple
levels of the organization may be asked to complete a written or oral questionnaire documenting
their beliefs, behaviors, observations, or opinions regarding various categories of organizational
factors and structure. Some of these questionnaires have been created by commercial designers
and provided to the aviation organization, but many are self-created by a safety manager or other
technical expert with safety responsibility. Many of these designing the questionnaires, however,
lack any training on survey methodology, design, implementation, or analysis, leaving the
organization with potentially incorrect or misleading data, or results that have been underanalyzed due to a lack of comprehension.
Unfortunately, the nature of organizational safety climate as residing heavily within the
perceptions and beliefs of its members makes understanding of climate as anything more than a
transient organizational state a challenge, particularly to the safety practitioner. Many
practitioners as well as researchers focus on single-year findings or, at most, year-to-year
changes in attitude or action as indicators of the health of the organization’s safety climate, and
by extension, its long-term culture (Schein, 2004). However, little work has been done to
examine multi-year trends in safety climate audit data, nor to use such multi-year trends to begin
an evaluation of the longer-term safety culture of the organization. The current research is an
attempt to begin to fill this gap as well as provide insight into other scientist-practitioners faced
with organizational questions and concerns about safety climate.
Methodology
In an attempt to begin to address the lack of multi-year data analysis within aviation
organizations, the authors collected 4 years’ worth of data (2012-2016) from the annual safety
climate audit questionnaire at a U.S. university’s collegiate aviation program, collected in the fall
of each year. Flight instructors, dispatchers, office workers, and supervisors throughout the flight
operation were requested to complete the audit survey each year; the organization has a nearly
100% response rate each year the survey was administered.
The safety climate audit questionnaire was created by the collegiate aviation program to evaluate
potential safety concerns occurring at the individual, team, or organizational level. The 74-item
questionnaire was designed by the organization and has been in use in various iterations since
2003. The most recent revision occurred in 2012; the present data set contains responses from
2013 to the present.

174

Respondent Demographics
Demographic data on respondents over the past 4 years can be seen in Table 1; as is apparent in
the tables, respondents are primarily young (69.4% are age 30 or younger) instructors (88.1%)
who are relatively new to the organization (77.7% have five or fewers years with the operation).
A total of 175 respondents completed the audit questionnaire over the past four years.
Table 1: Respondent Demographics
Respondent Reported Age Ranges
20-30
118
31-40
36
41-50
5
51-60
0
60
11

Years in Organization
<1
38
1-5
94
6-10
19
11-15
14
16-20
3
20+
2

Primary Job Responsibility
Flight Instructor
148
Supervisor/Manager
20

Years at Current Job
68
76
16
5
3
2

Certificates/Ratings Possessed
CFI
6
CFII
84
MEI
59
ATP
13
Other
3

The relative youth and short tenure of the majority of organization employees would suggest a
safety climate that would be more likely to be transient from year to year based on turnover and
developmental factors. To evaluate this, year over year comparisons for the safety climate audit
were analyzed using univariate analysis of variance with Bonferroni correction. Results found
that, of the 74 items on the safety climate questionnaire, only ten showed significant change in
the past four years. These items can be seen in Table 2.
Table 2: Questionnaire Items with Significant Longitudinal Change
Safety Climate Item

F value

The Assistant Aviation Safety Program
Manager has the power to make changes.
The Assistant Aviation Safety Program
Manager has little or no authority compared
to operations personnel.
Flight department management shows
favoritism to certain pilots.
Pilots who call in fatigued fear being
scrutinized by the chief pilot.
The chief pilot does not hesitate to contact
instructor pilots to discuss safety issues.

F (3,169) =3.613, p=.015
F (3,169) =3.032, p=.031

F (3,170) =4.635, p=.004
F (3,171) =4.164, p=.007
F (3,171) =4.212, p=.007
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Pairwise Comparison
Mean Scores
(Significant)
4.2766, s=1.28
5.1166, s=1.16
3.978, s=1.39
3.113, s=1.29

Year 1
Year 4
Year 1
Year 4

4.500, s=1.709
3.204, s=1.678
3.707, s=1.887
2.477, s=1.355
4.553, s=1.47
5.302, s=1.26

Year 3
Year 4
Year 3
Year 4
Year 1
Year 2

4.553, s=1.47

Year 1

As long as there is no accident or incident,
the chief pilot does not care how flight
operations are performed.
The chief pilot has a clear understanding of
risks associated with flight operations.

Pilots often report safety concerns to their
chief pilot rather than the safety department.
The flight supervisor consistently
emphasizes information or details (e.g.,
weather requirements, NOTAMs) that affect
flight safety.
The flight supervisor is responsive to pilots’
concerns about safety.

5.463, s=1.24

Year 3

F (3,171) =2.761, p=044

2.425, s=1.39
1.772, s=0.773

Year 1
Year 4

F (3,171) =3.513, p=.017

5.872, s=1.11
6.418, s=0.663

Year 1
Year 2

5.872, s=1.11
6.454, s=0.588

Year 1
Year 4

2.617, s=1.189
3.348, s=1.325
4.634, s=1.71
5.545, s=1.021

2013-2014

5.439, s=1.449
6.09, s=0.603)

Year 3
Year 4

F (3,169) =2.952, p=.034
F (3,171) =2.927, p=.035

F (3,171) =3.142, p=.027

Year 3
Year 4

Factor Analysis
The survey was designed with items clustered around 14 theoretical constructs; however, no
confirmatory analyses had been conducted to evaluate the extent to which questions actually
mapped to the organizational factors. Given the high turnover rate of the primary respondent
group (flight instructors), as well as the gap in time between each administration of the audit
questionnaire, the decision was made for the purpose of preliminary analyses to treat the annual
samples as independent for the purpose of evaluating the proposed factors. Even taking this
liberty, principal components analysis (PCA) failed to provide a stable factor structure. PCA was
attempted in order to reduce the number of survey items in use for subsequent analyses and
provide recommendations to the flight training program for ways in which to reduce the length
of the questionnaire. This failure is in part likely due to the questionnaire length (74 items) and
relative overall sample size (N=175).
Table 3: Intended Factors of Safety Climate Audit
Reporting System
Aviation Safety Program Manager
Assistant Aviation Safety Program Manager
Accountability
Pilot Authority
Professionalism
Chief Flight Instructor
Training Managers
Flight Supervisor
Ramp Operations
Instructors
Safety Values
Going Beyond Compliance
Institution Safety Record

Discussion
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The present study sought to increase understanding of longitudinal trends in organizational safety
climate, in order to identify stronger leverage points for organizational change and enhanced
safety performance. In addition, the study sought to evaluate the quality and utility of the annual
safety climate audit questionnaire in use in a large-scale collegiate aviation training organization.
Data presented here are based upon analysis of the initial training location under investigation;
final results based upon multi-site comparison are presented at the International Symposium on
Aviation Psychology and available after that meeting.
One of the key concerns to be discussed in final presentation of the data is the utilization of
disparate safety climate audits at each flight training location within the institution. The authors
strongly recommend that the institution identifies a single set of safety climate items for use at all
training locations in order to facilitate future cross-analyses and the impact of larger institutional
trends.
Data from Site 1 suggest that employee attitudes regarding the majority of safety climate
components have remained consistent over the past four years. Only ten of the 74 items in the
climate questionnaire showed significant differences in comparing data over time. This, when
coupled with the high rate of turnover among front line flight instructor employees, suggests a
remarkably consistent culture in existence within the training operation. This may be due in part
to the highly-regulated structure of the FAA Part 141 training program, or due to other
organizational factors. This finding may be one of the most significant of the study, as it
indicates areas in which change may be initially occurring within the organization, with regard to
employee attitudes. These ten items may be the indices of leverage points within the
organization; future research to explore and clarify these results is planned.
The authors propose substantially reducing the number of items in the safety climate audit using
a more theory-based factor structure. The current structure, with 74 items attempting to
encompass 14 factors, contains a large degree of conceptual overlap and a lack of question
clarity. This can be seen in the failure of the principal components analysis to provide a
consistent factor structure.
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